X-No-Archive: Yes

"Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in message
> Chilly8 wrote:
>> X-No-Archive: Yes
>> "bz" <bz+csf@ch100-5.chem.lsu.edu> wrote in message
>> news:Xns9A6092CEC9DDWQAHBGMXSZHVspammote@
>>> "Chilly8" <chilly8@hotmail.com> wrote in news:frboh0$ndn$1@aioe.org:
>>>> My proxy is an entry proxy to Tor. Since Tor has its own encryption,
>>>> there is no possible way for me, or anyone else, to monitor the
>>>> packets. Tor uses military-grade encryption.
>>> Packets in the clear enter your machine from your 'clients'.
>>> Your machine encrypts them and sends them to Tor.
>>> Tor responds and your machine decrypts them and sends them out in the
>>> clear
>>> to your 'clients'.
>>> What, exactly, keeps you from running netshark (or even a fork into a
>>> file)
>>> on the data stream between you and your clients?

>> There is no POSSIBLE way that I could monitor was is being sent, if
>> if I WANTED to.

> Nonsense.
>> I periodically purge the logs and overwrite

> Which doesn't limit to read the data from memory in any way,
>> with Evidence Eliminator

> And will you ****ward finally understand the Evidence Eliminator is a
> horribly broken piece of **** that leaves a lot of data it's supposed to
> overwrite!
> > Contrary to popular opinion, If you use EE running the

>> DOD spec for data destruction, there is NO forensic technique in
>> existance that is going to recover the data.

> There is a very trivial forensic technique: dd if=/dev/hdXY | grep "search
> term". Because EE doesn't overwrite the data as intended.

Actually, software programs, such as EE, are good enough to foil
forensic searches by U.S. Customs, at the border. Many
coporations that send the employess on international business
trips are now issuing their employess "forensicaly cleaned"
laptops, as the EFF puts it, so that the spooks in homeland
security that inspect computers that enter or re-enter the
U.S. cannot get any trade secrets or any other data that they
don't want DHS to get their hands on. While one EFF article
does not mention EE, specifically, it does mention that companies
are using disk-wiping software to scrub the disks of any company
laptops, before they eventually have to go through a U.S.
Customs inspection before returning to America. Corporate
America seems to trust this kind of software to evade DHS
snoops, at the borders. If corporate America trusts this
software to avoid U.S. Customs recovering any data, then
so do I.

We do the same here at the radio station, with our equipment
before it ever goes through any U.S. Customs inspection. EE
is used, at maximum level of destruction, to scrub the hard
disks, so that DHS will not be able to recover deleted data,
when the equipment is brought into America.