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Thread: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

  1. #81
    Nomen Nescio
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    In article <613oc6F1taan2U4@mid.dfncis.de>
    "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote:
    >
    > Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer wrote:
    >

    <snip>
    >
    > > The very definition of "full disk" precludes any access at all without it.

    >
    >
    > Obviously wrong.
    >

    <snip>

    Can you explain what happens when the OS is encrypted and
    the computer is turned on? How can booting the OS
    take place if the OS is encrypted?

    Isn't the function of "pre-boot authentication" in this
    instance to allow decryption and proceed with booting
    the OS?

    IOW, if you didn't have the pre-boot authentication, the
    computer would blank screen and not go any further.

    Are you making a distinction that is misleading? Like
    "Full disk doesn't necessarily include the OS." But
    the previous poster(s) are all talking about encrypting
    the C: drive WITH the OS (whether other drives are encrypted
    or not).


  2. #82
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    George Orwell <nobody@mixmaster.it> wrote in
    news:cfba7ec8f8b207e0a1bd089fe3255024@mixmaster.it:

    > nemo_outis wrote:
    >
    >> There must - necessarily! - be a small amount of unencrypted code on
    >> the boot/system volume. This is invariably located on track 0.

    >
    > Nope! I fact with *true* whole disk encryption there is absolutely no
    > unencrypted information on a device at all.


    Uhh, doofus, Windows cannot boot from a completely encrypted disk because
    there's nothing to decrypt those first bytes to even get the process
    started. Oddly enough, encrypted code is not executable. So if a system
    does not have a storage medium (i.e., boot drive) with some unencrypted
    boot loader on it, the system can't boot to HD. QED

    Those unencrypted bytes must be stored somewhere, and the BIOS looks at
    each storage device (MPTs and GPTs for HDs) to see which one is active to
    pass continuation of booting off to it. No unencrypted boot code stub,
    no boot from HD.

    Of course, if all you want to do is store data then Truecrypt can encrypt
    an entire drive in "superfloppy-ish" mode. But such a drive cannot boot
    Windows - this is a limitation of Windows, not full HD OTFE systems.

    As for an the unencrypted boot stub making it plain yyou are using
    encryption - yep, it does.

    And I hgave the workaround for that problem several posts back:
    overwrite track zeo with random junk after a session and restore the
    track 0 (most convenioently using the OTFE recovery disk) before each new
    session. This results in a drive being completely filled with ostensibly
    random data between uses.

    Regards,





  3. #83
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in
    news:613o4rF1taan2U2@mid.dfncis.de:

    > nemo_outis wrote:
    >
    >
    >> And it doesn't matter a whit! Truecrypt can completely protect the OS
    >> and all data.

    >
    >
    > And this was never disputed. Disputed was the claim that the entire
    > disk was encrypted whereas the partition table and the boot sector is
    > obviously not. And sadly since TrueCrypt does not offer any mechanism
    > so store the boot sector on another media, both are mutually
    > exclusive.
    >
    > And it does matter, since it disallows for plausible deniability.


    If that "other media" is permanently attached to the system (i.e.,
    "fixed") then plausible deniability is still shot. Since Microsoft only
    supports booting normal Windows (not PE, not embedded) from fixed media,
    what you want is unachievable with Windows as the OS (without violating
    the licence).

    However, if you are still worried about plausible deniability (although
    there being a good reason for having a system that contains only disks
    with random data strikes me as the epitome of implausible) then do as I
    suggested several posts earlier in this thread: overwrite track 0 with
    random junk after each session and restore it again at the start of the
    next session (most conveniently, by using the OTFE recovery disk/CD).

    Now be sure to post again, Sebastian, with more of your nonsensical
    attempts to complicate and obfuscate the straighfoprward.

    Regards,

  4. #84
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in
    news:613o84F1taan2U3@mid.dfncis.de:

    > nemo_outis wrote:
    >
    >
    >> If you have some argument to show how an unencrypted partition table
    >> would permit decrypting the contents of of an encrypted partition,
    >> then make it.

    >
    >
    > It doesn't. What it permits is to differ the encrypted disc from
    > random data, and it permits knowledge about the partitioning of the
    > volume inside the encrypted container.


    But it is a limitation of Windows, not of Truecrypt or any other whole-disk
    OTFE program, that causes the difficulty. Go give old Bill Gates a call
    and leave the rest of us in peace to contentedly use the magnificent new
    Truecrypt 5.

    Regards,

  5. #85
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote in
    news:b37ff94e4b489cb0606a73458d64d04b@dizum.com:

    >> Of course, you ****ing moron, that paragraph is mine, in my words
    >> - there are no quotation marks, no "Jeticos says" in it. It's a


    I would suggest that you enroll in a reading comprehension course.
    However, your problem is far more deep-seated than that: not an inability
    to read for understanding, but the mental incapability to understand at
    all.

    Now **** off, 'tard.


  6. #86
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    nospamatall <nospamatall@iol.ie> wrote in news:foigij$461$4@aioe.org:

    ....
    > Thank you. Why is cryptography inhabited by such obnoxious anti-social
    > twats?


    Oh, I've embarrassed them multiple times in the past with their silly
    errors, so they now keep coming back with childish attempts to catch me out
    with their stupid cavils and quibbles every time I post. And so I have to
    crush them yet again. Quite tiresome after the first few times, really.

    Regards,



  7. #87
    Sebastian G.
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    nemo_outis wrote:


    > If that "other media" is permanently attached to the system (i.e.,
    > "fixed") then plausible deniability is still shot. Since Microsoft only
    > supports booting normal Windows (not PE, not embedded) from fixed media,
    > what you want is unachievable with Windows as the OS (without violating
    > the licence).



    Once again: You can modify an normal Windows installation CD to allow
    installation and booting from USB mass storage, FireWire Mass Storage and SD
    Cards. Without any license violation. With a text editor and cabarc (which
    is free to download from Microsoft).

    > However, if you are still worried about plausible deniability (although
    > there being a good reason for having a system that contains only disks
    > with random data strikes me as the epitome of implausible)



    Implausible? Heck, every media I buy is throughly tested by a very simple
    yet highly effective scheme:

    dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1m count=X | tee /dev/hdX | sha1sum
    sync
    dd if=/dev/hdX | sha1sum

    If I never start using these media, then they will remain being filled with
    pseudorandom data.

    Ugh, and do you know what I do if I want to securely wipe media because I
    plan to sell them? You can guess:

    dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1m of=/dev/hdX

  8. #88
    Sebastian G.
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    nemo_outis wrote:

    > "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in
    > news:613o84F1taan2U3@mid.dfncis.de:
    >
    >> nemo_outis wrote:
    >>
    >>
    >>> If you have some argument to show how an unencrypted partition table
    >>> would permit decrypting the contents of of an encrypted partition,
    >>> then make it.

    >>
    >> It doesn't. What it permits is to differ the encrypted disc from
    >> random data, and it permits knowledge about the partitioning of the
    >> volume inside the encrypted container.

    >
    > But it is a limitation of Windows, not of Truecrypt or any other whole-disk
    > OTFE program, that causes the difficulty.



    Actually it is a limitation of TrueCrypt: It could actually encrypt the
    partition table and decrypt it on the fly, it would just require a special
    check for block 0 to not trying decrypt the MBR part and start decrypting at
    the location of the partition table.

    Additionally, if you do the pre-boot stuff, the MBR containing this code
    would also differ from random data. But TrueCrypt does not permit storing
    the MBR on another media and do some redirection.

  9. #89
    Ari
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    On Fri, 08 Feb 2008 17:40:22 GMT, nemo_outis wrote:

    > I'll be happy to post the method again if anyone cares.
    >
    > Regards,


    I do.

    I love you and you know that.
    --
    An Explanation Of The Need To Be "Anonymous"
    http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19

  10. #90
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in
    news:61496qF1smtekU1@mid.dfncis.de:

    > nemo_outis wrote:
    >
    >
    >> If that "other media" is permanently attached to the system (i.e.,
    >> "fixed") then plausible deniability is still shot. Since Microsoft
    >> only supports booting normal Windows (not PE, not embedded) from
    >> fixed media, what you want is unachievable with Windows as the OS
    >> (without violating the licence).


    > Once again: You can modify an normal Windows installation CD to allow
    > installation and booting from USB mass storage, FireWire Mass Storage
    > and SD Cards. Without any license violation. With a text editor and
    > cabarc (which is free to download from Microsoft).



    No, Sebastian, such a modification of Windows is not authorized by
    Microsoft. But, if you are determined to do it anyway, then who am I to
    stop you. Take the bit in your teeth, charge madly off, and behave as
    rashly as you wish.

    However, none of this reflects one bit on Truecrypt. Since you now have
    your (unauthorized) USB boot drive, every other HD on the system could be
    encrypted as a Truecrypt "superfloppy" that has absolutely everything
    encrypted.

    May you live happily with your system configured this way and no longer
    pester others with your inanities.

    And BTW, Sebastian, it's still utterly implausible that someone has a
    computer system with every HD completely filled with random junk.

    Remmember, Sebastian, it's not whether you find such patent nonsense
    plausible but whether a judge and jury do.

    Regards,

  11. #91
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in
    news:6149deF1touudU1@mid.dfncis.de:

    > nemo_outis wrote:
    >
    >> "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in
    >> news:613o84F1taan2U3@mid.dfncis.de:
    >>
    >>> nemo_outis wrote:
    >>>
    >>>
    >>>> If you have some argument to show how an unencrypted partition
    >>>> table would permit decrypting the contents of of an encrypted
    >>>> partition, then make it.
    >>>
    >>> It doesn't. What it permits is to differ the encrypted disc from
    >>> random data, and it permits knowledge about the partitioning of the
    >>> volume inside the encrypted container.

    >>
    >> But it is a limitation of Windows, not of Truecrypt or any other
    >> whole-disk OTFE program, that causes the difficulty.

    >
    >
    > Actually it is a limitation of TrueCrypt: It could actually encrypt
    > the partition table and decrypt it on the fly, it would just require a
    > special check for block 0 to not trying decrypt the MBR part and start
    > decrypting at the location of the partition table.


    Truecrypt still has to put the bootstub on the boot HD, and that's a dead
    giveaway that encryption is being used, no matter whether the partition
    table is encrypted or not. Hell, the partition table being plaintext is
    much more "vanilla."

    > Additionally, if you do the pre-boot stuff, the MBR containing this
    > code would also differ from random data. But TrueCrypt does not permit
    > storing the MBR on another media and do some redirection.


    Yes, Truecrypt has not COMPLETELY redesigned Windows' boot process to
    accomodate a kook like you.

    Regards,




  12. #92
    nemo_outis
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    Ari <arisilverstein@yahoo.com> wrote in
    news:1f1ux0vajj9g7.1i6hv3ciyph87.dlg@40tude.net:

    > On Fri, 08 Feb 2008 17:40:22 GMT, nemo_outis wrote:
    >
    >> I'll be happy to post the method again if anyone cares.
    >>
    >> Regards,

    >
    > I do.
    >
    > I love you and you know that.




    Here (from 2004) is the method whereby a suitably configured OS (or
    powerful system-level program, etc.) could leak the encryption key of a
    full-HD OTFE program without changing the encryption algorithm in the
    least. My old description is in terms of DCPP but the method generalizes
    to all such programs, including Truecrypt. All that is required is that
    the full-HD OTFE user have installed a particular OS which has, say,
    already been modifed back at Microsoft by the NSA to have the
    capabilities I describe.




    ********************************************
    A malign OS can leak the encryption key even while fully and perfectly
    adhering to the DCPP encryption scheme. And it can leak the key on the
    ordinary data areas of the HD - no hidey-holes required. The scheme will
    pass every validation test, because it fully adheres to the DCPP
    encryption rules.

    AND YET THE KEY WILL HAVE BEEN LEAKED!
    ********************************************

    Bear with me, for this is a little complicated to explain.

    I'm going to describe the unobfuscated way of doing this at first.
    First of all, I take as given that the malign OS can harvest the key from
    memory. So the OS knows the key (say 256-bit for the sake of
    concreteness)

    Now, it is perfectly legitimate for the OS to write data for its own
    purposes in a sequence of sectors (say as part of the swap file).
    However, according to the DCPP encryption mechanism it must encrypt them
    using the algorithm and key (and IV) that is prescribed by DCPP. So
    here's what the malign OS does next.

    Let's say the first 3 bits of the key are 001

    For the first in a series of 256 consecutive sectors in the swap file
    (and the OS can easily ensure these are also consecutive physical sectors
    on the HD as well) the OS generates some random data. It then encrypts
    it following the DCPP algorithm perfectly. If it encrypts to an odd 512-
    byte number, the OS writes the sector. If it doesn't, it generates a new
    random number and tries again. Very quickly it finds a value that will
    encrypt to an odd 512-byte number. Satisfied, it writes the data to the
    sector. Here's the crux: the OS has just written a sector that can be
    interpreted as a binary zero (i.e., if the whole 512-byte encrypted
    sector is odd). It has just leaked the first bit of the key!

    The OS repeats the process for the next sector until it again writes what
    can be interpreted as a "zero" (i.e., the whole 512-byte encrypted sector
    is odd). It has just leaked the second bit of the key!

    The OS repeats the process again for the third bit - except this time the
    sector must encrypt to an even 512-byte number to signal a binary one.
    The OS writes the sector, thus leaking the third bit of the key.

    And so on and so on until the OS has leaked the entire 256-bit key as a
    sequence of 256 consecutive completely-properly-encrypted sectors, with
    each sector interpreted as binary 0 or 1 according to whether its whole
    512-byte contents are even or odd!

    But how would someone looking at the disk know where the OS has leaked
    the key? Answer: the OS uses (say) a ten-sector sequence of all evens
    (say) to signal that the next 256 sectors should be interpreted as the
    key!

    Result: the malign OS has fully conformed to the encryption rules. Every
    sector is correctly encrypted according to the rules - no exceptions! No
    data has been written to any hidey-hole. AND YET THE KEY HAS BEEN
    LEAKED!

    Assuming you understand the above, you can now add obfuscation. For
    instance, there is no need for the "key follows" signal to be ten 1's -
    it could just as easily be 1001001101110111.

    Similarly, the malign OS needn't leak the key as "plaintext" - it can
    encrypt/obscure the leaked key sequence using a prearranged scheme known
    only to the NSA and Microsoft.

    As I said in a previous post: Covert channels are a bitch to plug!

    Regards,

    PS Needless to say, once the principle is grasped, zillions of
    variants readily spring to mind.


  13. #93
    Ari
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    On Fri, 08 Feb 2008 15:58:52 GMT, nemo_outis wrote:

    > "Sebastian G." <seppi@seppig.de> wrote in
    > news:613aivF1ti8nnU1@mid.dfncis.de:
    >
    >> nemo_outis wrote:
    >>> Superfloppyish-based encrypted storage is only suitable for data
    >>> storage, not for a bootable Windows system. In fact, independent of
    >>> any encryption aspects, Windows has been deliberately crippled so it
    >>> can NOT boot/run from removable media such as superfloppies
    >>> (Microsoft says it's a licencing issue).

    >
    >> Nonsense. Microsoft has only disabled this option by default, since
    >> they don't want to support such configurations.

    >
    > Ahh, that's more like it. I feel much better when Sebastian reverts to
    > his old self and spouts ********. The world is running as expected.


    munch munch munch munch

    Hilda, bring the ****ing beer, will ya', it's heating up in here!!
    --
    An Explanation Of The Need To Be "Anonymous"
    http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19

  14. #94
    Ari
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    On Fri, 08 Feb 2008 21:11:48 +0000, nospamatall wrote:

    > Why is cryptography inhabited by such obnoxious anti-social
    > twats?


    Live your life inside of extraterrestrial symbols and algorithmic heaven
    and see if you can get a hard on.
    --
    An Explanation Of The Need To Be "Anonymous"
    http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19

  15. #95
    Ari
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    On Fri, 08 Feb 2008 23:11:49 GMT, nemo_outis wrote:

    > Oh, I've embarrassed them multiple times in the past with their silly
    > errors, so they now keep coming back with childish attempts to catch me out
    > with their stupid cavils and quibbles every time I post. And so I have to
    > crush them yet again. Quite tiresome after the first few times, really.


    So you're on amphetamines?

    Got it.

    munch munch munch munch
    --
    An Explanation Of The Need To Be "Anonymous"
    http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2004/03/19

  16. #96
    Anonymous
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    Sebastian G. wrote:

    > Cyberiade.it Anonymous Remailer wrote:
    >
    >
    > >> Are you usually this thick? Yes, even though you have a
    > >> whole-disk encryption program you can choose not to encrypt some
    > >> partitions - or any of them for that matter. However, choosing
    > >> not to use the program's capability for whole-disk encryption
    > >> doesn't make it one whit less a whole-disk encryption program.

    > >
    > > Problem is, with Truecrypt you don't have that choice.

    >
    >
    > So then my fully encrypted harddisk with even an encrypted partition table
    > is pure imagination?


    It sure as hell is if you think you have a usable operating system
    installed on it.

    >
    > > Go ahead and try it. Encrypt an entire drive and see if you can
    > > install an OS to it.

    >
    >
    > Who cares for installing an OS? This drive only contains data, the OS is on
    > another media.


    Exactly. That's what tells us you're using partition/volume encryption
    rather than whole disk encryption.

    I have no idea where you're getting your definitions and information
    from, or whether you're just making **** up as you go, but even
    Truecrypt doesn't claim to be whole disk encryption.

    Do you really think you're more knowledgeable about the product than the
    people who write and maintain it? Are you that self deluded?






  17. #97
    Anonymous
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    nemo_outis wrote:

    <snip>

    > > I haven't tried it out yet, but the nice thing about system
    > > partition encryption is that you should be able to create a
    > > hidden volume on a system partition which would be truly
    > > invisible to the host partition and any OS you have installed
    > > there. In theory, the choice of passwords at boot time could
    > > switch back and forth between two completely different and
    > > independent operating environments. That's an even better
    > > alternative to running guest operating systems under VMWare for
    > > some of us, if it's actually possible.
    > >
    > > Has anyone played with this yet? I may have to hook a monitor
    > > up to an old machine. ;)
    > >
    > >
    > >>
    > >> Andy

    >
    > If you use any current scheme of full HD OTFE encryption then the
    > fact that you use encryption is necessarily given away. The code
    > in the "bootable stub" of the encryption program on track zero
    > will disclose to any knowledgeable investigator, not only that
    > you are using full HD encryption, but which vendor's. In fact,
    > often just the "signature byte" of an (unencrypted) partition
    > table is enough to reveal the encryption vendor.


    <snip>

    None of that has anything at all to do with what the guy was
    talking about. Nobody is even suggesting the use of Truecrypt would
    be hidden, he's talking about hardening Truecrypt's plausible
    deniability by using hidden volumes to create two completely
    separate encrypted OS installs, and using the password mechanism as
    a sort of boot loader. Is such a thing possible?

    Please..... if you don't understand the question don't try and give
    an answer.


  18. #98
    Anonymous
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    Sebastian G. wrote:

    > Merk wrote:
    >
    > > nemo_outis wrote:
    > >> http://www.truecrypt.org/
    > >>
    > >> Regards,

    > >
    > > Anyone tried it?

    >
    >
    > I tried it, and, unlike most other pre-boot stuff, actually
    > worked on my trivial test machine.
    >
    > However, I found a privilege escalation vulnerability from
    > version 4.3a being carried over, so I heavily recommend to avoid
    > using TrueCrypt until it's fixed.


    You didn't find ****. There's no such vulnerability that hasn't
    been fixed, and all you're doing is spreading FUD to try and make
    yourself look important. You've pulled that same crap before too,
    and got spanked right out of a couple forums because of it.

    Isn't that right, "Gobbleslop"? ;-)

    > > Is it whole disk encryption like PGP whole disk encryption?


    It aint NOTHING like PGPWHoleDisk.


    >
    >
    > Nah, it also allows for some kinds of dual boot configurations.
    > And it compiles with much less changes. And it's far more
    > lightweight.



  19. #99
    Anonymous
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    nemo_outis wrote:

    > Nomen Nescio <nobody@dizum.com> wrote in
    > news:8bfad53b8d4b69cd8d27311d874867f6@dizum.com:
    >
    > > nemo_outis wrote:
    > >> The entire disk IS encrypted, with the exception of the boot stub on
    > >> track 0.

    >
    > > Tell you what, why don't you go right ahead and shrink your main
    > > bootable partition on your first hard drive and create another
    > > partition on that drive (if you don't have one there already) and then
    > > use Truecrypt to encrypt that entire drive as a single device so the
    > > entire disk IS encrypted. Let us know how that works out for you.
    > >
    > > Hope you have backups. ;)

    >
    > You really are a whining caviller. However, lest others be misled, I will
    > explain why I am 100% correct.


    You're not correct, and you're own waffling words prove it....

    > You see, the space on a HD, as conventionally set up, consists entirely of
    > the following: the boot track and one or more partitions. (This excludes
    > the rare cases where there is unallocated unpartitioned space on the drive,
    > and arcana such as the HPA and manufacturer's reserved space).
    >
    > So, if you encrypt all partitions on such a drive (as Truecrypt v5 now
    > allows you to do, even if it is the boot/system drive) you have encrypted
    > the **whole drive** - with the exception, of course, of the small


    Yes, you've encrypted the **whole drive** with noted exceptions, but not
    the "whole disk" as a contiguous piece of real estate as true whole disk
    encryption tools do (including the partition table). Even you realize
    this, and stated so in spite of your continued argumentative tone and
    hurling of insults. There is a difference, and you've been provided
    cites and examples to show why for some people this may be an issue. No
    amount of quibbling over your queer interpretations of terms can change
    that, or the fact that even Truecrypt acknowledges the difference.












  20. #100
    Anonymous
    Guest

    Re: Truecrypt 5.0 Released (now with system partition encryption)

    Phil Carmody wrote:

    > Casper <spam@spam.spam> writes:
    > > >
    > > > Who cares for installing an OS? This drive only contains
    > > > data, the OS is on another media.

    > >
    > > LOL LOL LOL >:|
    > >
    > > You will never understand what we are talking about.
    > > Maybe your posts should not appear in alt.privacy at all
    > > I am putting up a filter.

    >
    > Anything which separates alt.privacy from sci.crypt is
    > a good thing. Keeping your ill-thought-out gibberings
    > off sci.crypt would in particular be appreciated.


    You could always try alt.whining.cunts.moderated.

    It's that way ------------------------------------->









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